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BACK TO THE FUTURE! IS THE
"NEW" RIGID CHOICE OF LAW RULE
FOR INTERPROVINCIAL TORTS
CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED?0
BY JEAN-GABRIEL CASTEL, Q.C.*
In the last few years, the Supreme Court of Canada has
held that private international law rules applicable to
the jurisdiction of Canadian courts and the recognition
and enforcement of the judgments of sister provinces
must conform to the demands of territoriality and the
principles of order and fairness which flow from the
existence of an implied Full Faith and Credit clause in
the Canadian Constitution. More recently, the Court
has decided that, with respect to choice of law, the
ancient fex loci delicti rule is applicable to both
interprovincial and foreign torts and that it admits no
exceptions in interprovincial litigation on the ground
that the nature of Canadian constitutional
arrangements requires such a solution. The author
disagrees as he believes that it is inappropriate for the
Court to attempt to constitutionalize all private
international law rules applicable to interprovincial
conflicts. The result would be two sets of private
international law rules leading to discrimination against
foreign litigation. He is also of the opinion that in the
field of torts, an absolute rule for interprovincial
litigation is a step backward. Justice requires the
recognition of exceptions to the application of the lex
loci deici rule in appropriate circumstances.
11 y a quelques ann6es d6ja, la Cour supreme du
Canada avait d6cid6 que les ragles du droit
international priv6 qui d6terminent la competence
interprovinciale des tribunaux canadiens ainsi que les
conditions de reconnaissance et d'ex6cution des
jugements d'une autre province, devaient so conformer
aux exigences pos6es par Ia territoriait6 et aux
principes d'ordre et de justice qui dbcoulent d'une
clause de "bonne foi et credit" implicite dans la
constitution canadiene. Plus rcemment, la Cour fat
d'avis que, dans la domaine des conflits de lois, la ragle
classique de la lex loci delicti s'applique A la
responsabilit6 civile d6lictuelle et quasi-d6lictuele,
quelque soit le lieu oit le fait gdn6rateur de ia
responsabilit6 s'est produit. Lorsqu'il s'agit de confllts
interprovinciaux, la nature des accords constitutionnels
ne permet aucune d6rogation A cette r~gle.
L'auteur n'est pas d'accord. i estime qu'il n'est pas
bon de "constitutionnaliser" les ragles du droit
international priv6 qui s'appliquent aux conflits
interprovinciaux. I en r6sulterait deux groupes de
ragles distinctes, cc qui nuirait aux conflits
internationaux. 11 vaut mieux soumettre les conflits
interprovinciaux et les conflits internationaux aux
memes regles. L'auteur est aussi d'avis que dans le
domaine de la responsabilit6 civile d6lictuelle et quasi-
d6lictuelle, une ragle qul n'admet pas d'exceptions est
malencontreuse. Le cas dch6ant, an nom de la justice,
les tribunaux doivent pouvoir 6carter la ex o delict.
© 1995, J.-G. Castel.
* Distinguished Research Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. The author
is grateful to his colleague, Professor Peter Hogg, for his helpful comments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a series of cases,1 beginning in 1990, the Supreme Court of
Canada has held that, to be constitutionally valid, statutory or judicial
private international law rules applicable to all interprovincial situations
must conform to the demands of territoriality and the principles of order
1 Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 [hereinafter Morguard];
Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897
[hereinafterAmchem]; Hunt v. T& NPLC, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 [hereinafterHunt]; and Tolofson v.
Jensen; Lucas v. Gagnon (1995), 100 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1 [hereinafter Tolofson and Lucas].
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and fairness. 2 In other words, there are now two grounds for challenging
the constitutionality of a statutory or judicial rule of private international
law: the traditional limitation on the power of the provinces to legislate
extraterritorially and the new constitutional principles of order and
fairness.3
These principles were applied first to the general rules of
jurisdiction of Canadian courts and the common law rules of recognition
and enforcement of sister-province judgments and, more recently, seem
to have been extended to common law choice of law rules for
interprovincial torts.
The "constitutionalization" of all aspects of private international
law rules relevant to interprovincial situations could soon create two sets
of rules: those applicable to cases containing legally relevant foreign
elements and those applicable to cases containing legally relevant
elements from other provinces.
In a highly integrated world economy that requires private
international law rules best capable of promoting suitable conditions for
the development of interprovincial and international commerce,4 it
seems inappropriate for the Supreme Court to adopt rules that call for a
more generous acceptance of the laws, jurisdictional rules, and
judgments of sister-provinces. An interprovincial comity based on the
new constitutional principles of order and fairness, which have their
source in the notions of full faith and credit and due process held to be
implicit in the Canadian Constitution,5 would be equally applicable to
international situations.6 In today's world, there is no valid justification
for or advantage in treating interprovincial and international conflicts
2 Hunt, ibid. at 326-27.
3 Morguard, supra note 1 at 1095 and 1099-1101.
4 Paraphrasing Professor H.E. Yntema in "The Objectives of Private International Law"
(1957) 35 Can. Bar Rev. 721 at 741, which was relied upon by the Supreme Court in Morguard to
support the principles of order and fairness.
5 Morguard, supra note 1 at 1101: "In short, the rules of comity or private international law as
they apply between the provinces must be shaped to conform to the federal structure of the
Constitution." Note that the notion of due process found in the 14th amendment to the American
Constitution is not the exact equivalent to "fundamental justice" in section 7 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
6 Professor Peter Hogg has remarked: "The conflicts law of each Canadian province has
developed with little regard for the idea that there are constitutional limits on provincial
extraterritorial competence, or the idea that, within a federal state, conflicts law rules might require
modification upon constitutional grounds": Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1992) at 328.
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differently. With the exception of Hunt,7 the Supreme Court could have
reached the same results without giving a constitutional dimension to the
decisions under study. International comity demands no less than
interprovincial comity. All aspects of private international or
interprovincial law should be subjected to the same limitation: that there
must exist a real and substantial connection to the forum for it to take
jurisdiction or to apply its own law, and to have its judgments recognized
elsewhere.
II. ORDER AND FAIRNESS IN INTERPROVINCIAL PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW: JURISDICTION, PROCEDURE,
AND JUDGMENTS
Morguard Investment Ltd. v. De Savoye8 is the first case where the
Supreme Court laid down special rules applicable to interprovincial
situations. It involved the recognition and enforcement in British
Columbia of personal default judgments granted in Alberta against an
absent defendant served ex juris in foreclosure proceedings for
deficiencies on the sale of mortgaged property located in the latter
province. The Supreme Court held that if it is fair and reasonable for the
courts of one province to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case, it
should, as a general principle, be reasonable for the courts of another
province to enforce the resulting judgment. Mr. Justice La Forest, on
behalf of the Court, stated:
[R]ecognition in other provinces should be dependent on the fact that the court giving
judgment "properly" or "appropriately" exercised jurisdiction. It may meet the demands
of order andfairness to recognize a judgment given in a jurisdiction that had the greatest
or at least significant contacts with the subject matter of the action. But it hardly accords
with principles of order andfairness to permit a person to sue another in any jurisdiction,
without regard to the contacts that jurisdiction may have to the defendant or the subject
matter of the suit.9
His Lordship remarked that, in the past, Canadian courts had
been wrong to transpose the common law rules developed for the
recognition and enforcement of foreign money judgments to the
recognition and enforcement of judgments from sister provinces.
Principles of order and fairness must obtain in this area of private
international law. When present, they create a type of interprovincial
7 It is the only case that was argued in constitutional terms: supra note 1.
9 Ibid. at 1103 [emphasis added].
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comity which requires the recognition and enforcement of the judgments
of sister provinces as it "is based on the common interest of both the
jurisdiction giving judgment and the recognizing jurisdiction. Indeed, it
is in the interest of the whole country, an interest recognized in the
Constitution itself."10 Thus, "[in short, the rules of comity or private
international law as they apply between the provinces must be shaped to
conform to the federal structure of the Constitution."11
The relevant test in determining the appropriate forum, which is
based on the principles of order and fairness, is whether there was a real
and substantial connection between the court which gave the judgment
and the action.12 The court must have reasonable grounds for assuming
jurisdiction if its judgment is to be recognized and enforced in other
provinces pursuant to an implicit Full Faith and Credit clause in the
Constitution of Canada.13 However, it is a test, the Supreme Court tells
us, which cannot be applied rigidly.14
The real and substantial connection to the forum that assumed
jurisdiction, a test designed to give substance to order and fairness, is not
very demanding, although there must be limits on claims to
jurisdiction.1 5 In Morguard, the Supreme Court refrained from
determining these limits on the ground that no court can anticipate what
constitutes a reasonable assumption of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the
Court did state that traditional rules of jurisdiction would be a good
place to start16 and that each limit must be defined in accordance with
the broad principles of order and fairness.' 7 This approach is
constructive, but should it be restricted to interprovincial litigation? At
the time, Morguard simply modified the common law rules applicable to
both interprovincial and foreign judgments1 8 This was acknowledged
10 Ibid. at 1107.
11 Mid. at 1101. See also Hunt, supra note 1 at 325: "One must emphasize that the ideas of
'comity' are not an end in themselves, but are grounded in notions of order and fairness to
participants in litigation with connections to multiple jurisdictions."
12 Morguard, supra note 1 at 1108.





18 It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the various aspects of this decision. This has
already been done extensively. See Hogg, supra note 6 at 331-35; V. Black, "The Other Side of
Morguard: New Limits on Judicial Jurisdiction" (1993) 22 Can. Bus. LJ. 4; E. Edinger, "Moiguard
1995]
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by Canadian courts which did not wait long to extend the new rules to
foreign judgmentsj 9
Why should the principles of order and fairness be given
constitutional status? They could underlie any modem system of private
international law of a unitary as well as a federal state.
In Morguard, the Supreme Court expressed the view that
principles of order and fairness are "principles that ensure security of
transactions with justice;"20 that is, fairness to the defendant which
requires that "the judgment be issued by a court acting through fair
process and with properly restrained jurisdiction." 21
Although fairness is a flexible concept, in the constitutional
context, as already noted, it means a real and substantial connection to
the forum province. This test narrows the permissible basis for the
exercise of judicial jurisdiction.
The originality of the Court's approach lies in subjecting the
relevant connections to the broad principles of order and fairness and
subsequently, in Hunt, giving constitutional status to these principles.
v. De Savoye: Subsequent Developments" 22 Can. Bus. LJ. 29; P. Finkle & C. Labrecque, "Low-
Cost Legal Remedies and Market Efficiency: Looking Beyond Morguard" 22 Can. Bus. Li. 58; 1.
Swan, "The Uniform Enforcement of Canadian Judgments Act" 22 Can Bus. LIJ. 87; J.A. Woods,
"Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments Between Provinces: The Constitutional Dimensions
of Morguard Investments Ltd." 22 Can. Bus. L.J. 104; J.-G. Castel, "Recognition and Enforcement of
a Sister-Province Default Money Judgment: Jurisdiction Based on Real and Substantial
Connection" (1991) 7 B.F.L.R. 111; P. Finkle & S. Coakeley, "Morguard Investments Limited:
Reforming Federalism from the Top" (1991) 14 Dalhousie LJ. 340; V. Black & I. Swan, "New
Rules for the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye" (1991)
12 Advocates' Q. 489; J. Blom, "Conflict of Laws-Enforcement of Extraprovincial Default
Judgment-Real and Substantial Connection: Morguard Investments Ltd. v.De Savoye" (1991) 70
Can. Bar Rev. 733; H.P. Glenn, "Foreign Judgments, the Common Law and the Constitution: De
Savoye v. Moiguard Investments Ltd." (1992) 37 McGill LJ. 537; and J.-G. Castel, Canadian Conflict
of Laws, 3d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at 6-15 and 266-68 [hereinafter Canadian Conflict of
Laws].
19 See, for instance, Arrowmaster Inc. v. Unique Forming Ltd. (1993), 17 O.R. (3d) 407 (Gen.
Div.); FederalDeposit Insurance Corp. v. Vanstone (1992), 63 B.C.L.R. (2d) 190 (S.C.); Clarke v. Lo
Blanco (1991), 59 B.C.LR. (2d) 334 (S.C.); Minkler & Kirschbaum v. Sheppard (1991), 60 B.C.L.R.
(2d) 360 (S.C.); Moses v. Shore Boat Builders Ltd. (1993), 106 D.L.R. (4th) 654 (B.C. CA.); Stoddard
v.Accurpress Manufacturing Ltd. (1993), 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 194 (S.C.); and Allen v. Lynch (1993), 111
Nfld. & P.E.I.1. 43 (P.E.I.S.C.T.D.). But see Evans Dodd v. Gambin Associates (1994), 17 O.R.
(3d) 803 (Gen. Div.), which held, at 809, that Morguard does not alter the law relating to foreign
judgments.
2 0 Supra note 1 at 1097. According to Black, supra note 18 at 23, the notion of order echoes
concern with peace, order and good government in section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K),
30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. It also expresses concern with efficient and orderly territorial allocation of the
adjudicatory function.
21 Morguard, ibid. at 1103.
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The most important and most often cited objectives, guiding
principles, or choice-influencing considerations relevant to private
international law do not use the expressions "order and fairness" or
"order and justice," which have a constitutional flavour. However, these
expressions are merely other ways of describing the general objectives of
legal certainty and flexibility, mentioned by Aristotle centuries ago,22
and basic to any legal system.
Legal certainty requires clear, equal, and predictable rules of law
which enable those who are subject to them to organize their affairs in
an orderly manner to protect their justified expectations. Equally
relevant is the need for flexible and just solutions which take into
consideration the unique circumstances of each case. In practice, there
always exists some tension between the principle of order on the one
hand and the principle of fairness on the other. Depending upon the
circumstances, one may prevail over the other or be totally absent 23
This is why, in the past, escape devices have been used by the courts to
displace and adjust rigid and mechanical legal rules in appropriate
circumstances to defuse any potential conflict between the principles of
order and justice.
The concept of a real and substantial connection as a basic rule is
dangerous as it revels in subjectivity. It does not always achieve certainty
and predictability because there may be several real and substantial
connections pointing to different jurisdictions. Therefore, it seldom
achieves justice and should only be used to correct a bad situation.
Hunt v. T & N PLC24 is a very important decision because the
Supreme Court of Canada gave constitutional status to the principles of
Morguard25 and expressed the opinion that they applied equally to the
rules of forum non conveniens26 stated in Amchem Products Inc. v. B.C.
(WCB).27 In the latter case, the issue before the Court was whether an
2 2 Te Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. V, c. 10, quoted by S.C. Symeonides in "Exception Clauses in
American Conflicts Law" (1994) 42 Am. J. Comp. L 813 at 813. See also P.H. Neuhaus, "Legal
Certainty Versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws" (1963) 28 Law & Contemp. Probs. 795; P. Hay,
"Flexibility Versus Predictability and Uniformity in Choice of Law: Reflections on Current
European and United States Conflict Law" (1991) 226 Recueil des cours 281; and F. Mosconi,
"Exceptions to the Operation of Choice of Law Rules" (1989) 217 Recueil des cours 9.
23 For an analysis of objectives or choice-influencing considerations see Canadian Conflict of
Laws, supra note 18 at 47-52.
24 Supra note 1.
25 /bid. at 324.
2 6 ibid. at 326.
2 7 Supra note 1.
1995]
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anti-suit injunction issued in British Columbia, which sought to prevent
the appellants from pursuing their action against the respondents in
Texas, should be set aside. The resolution of that issue required an
examination of Canadian rules of private international law relating to
forum non conveniens and anti-suit injunctions. Interprovincial comity
was not involved in that case.2 8
In the Hunt case, the plaintiff sought to have documents
concerning a business in Quebec brought before a court in British
Columbia. This raised the issue of whether Quebec's Business Concerns
Records Act,29 a blocking statute which prohibits, inter alia, the removal
from Quebec of documents of business concerns in that province, was
ultra vires or constitutionally inapplicable in British Columbia.
After coming to the conclusion that a court of one province can
determine the constitutionality of the law of another province that
incidentally arises in the ordinary course of litigation, the Supreme
Court reiterated that the guiding element in the determination of the
appropriate forum for this purpose must be the principles of order and
fairness30 referred to in Morguard.
The courts of the enacting province have no exclusive
jurisdiction in this regard since all Canadian courts are routinely called
upon to apply foreign law in appropriate cases. Thus, the courts of
British Columbia had such jurisdiction, especially since the issue related
to the constitutionality of the legislation of a province that had
extraterritorial effects in another province, although it was not ultra vires
as such.
Referring to Morguard at length,3 1 the Supreme Court,. per La
Forest J., made it clear that interprovincial situations call for special
private international law rules:
I do not think litigation engendered against a corporate citizen located in one province by
its trading and commercial activities in another province should necessarily be subject to
the same rules as those applicable to international commerce. In particular, when a
corporate citizen situate in one province chooses to engage in trading and commercial
activities in other provinces, the rules governing consequential litigation, specifically rules
for the recognition and enforcement of judgments, should be adapted to the specific
nature of the Canadian federation. And it is difficult to believe that ordinary individuals
28 For cases takingAmchen into account, see, for example, Frymerv. Brelschneider (1994), 19
O.R. (3d) 60 (CA.). References to comity are found inAmchem, supra note 1 at 913, 930, 931, 934,
937, and 940.
29 R.S.Q. 1977, c. D-12.
30 Hunt, supra note 1 at 313-14.
31 ibid. at 321-27.
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moving across Canada in the exercise of their common right of citizenship should be
treated differently;, see Black v. Law Society ofAlberta, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591fl2
IHis Lordship then stated unequivocally that the constitutional
considerations in Morguard are constitutional imperatives which apply
to the provincial legislatures as well as to the courts:
In short, to use the expressions employed in Morguard, at p. 1100, the "integrating
character of our constitutional arrangements as they apply to interprovincial mobility"
calls for the courts in each province to give "full faith and credit" to the judgments of the
courts of sister provinces. This, as also noted in Morguard, is inherent in the structure of
the Canadian federation, and, as such, is beyond the power of provincial legislatures to
override. This does not mean, however, that a province is debarred from enacting any
legislation that may have some effect on litigation in other provinces or indeed from
enacting legislation respecting modalities for recognition of judgments of other
provinces. But it does mean that it must respect the minimum standards of order and
fairness addressed in Mo'guard
33
The same holds true with respect to the exercise of discretion not
to exercise jurisdiction: "Whatever approach is used, the assumption of
and the discretion not to exercise jurisdiction must ultimately be guided
by the requirements of order and fairness, not a mechanical counting of
contacts or connections."3 4
Applying the principles of order and fairness to the Quebec
statute, La Forest J. stated:
A province undoubtedly has an interest in protecting the property of its residents within
the province, but it cannot do so by unconstitutional means. Here the means chosen are
intended to unconditionally refuse recognition to orders and thereby impede litigation,
not only in foreign countries but in other provinces. At least when a court order is
sought, if not before, a judicial order in another province will be denied effect. There are
no qualifications. No discretion is given so it can scarcely be said that the Act respects
the principles of order and fairness which must, under the Morguard principle, inform the
procedures required for litigation having extraprovincial effects. Apart from the
legislative aspect, the situation inMorguard differed in that the appellant there sought
refusal of recognition after the judgment was rendered. But the constitutional mandate
cannot be avoided by a preemptive strike. The whole purpose of a blocking statute is to
32 N& at 323-24.
33 Ibid. at 324.
3 4 Ibid. at 326. Note that the Supreme Court added in obiter, at 326-27, that the federal
parliament had the power to legislate respecting the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments:
This issue is ultimately related to the rights of the citizen, trade and commerce and other
federal legislative powers, including that encompassed in the peace, order and good
government clause. But subject to these overriding powers, I see no reason why the
provinces should not be able to legislate in the area, subject, however, to the principles in
Morguard and to the demands of territoriality as expounded in the cases, most recently in
Re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, [19841 1 S.C.R. 297.
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impede successful litigation or prosecution in other jurisdictions by refusing recognition
and compliance with orders issued there. Everybody realizes that the whole point of
blocking statutes is not to keep documents in the province, but rather to prevent
compliance, and so the success of litigation outside the province that that province finds
objectionable. This is no doubt part of sovereign right, but it certainly runs counter to
comity. In the political realm it leads to strict retaliatory laws and power struggles. And
it discourages international commerce and efficient allocation and conduct of litigation.
It has similar effects on the interprovincial level, effects that offend against the basic
structure of the Canadian federation 235
On this note, His Lordship concluded that the Quebec statute was
constitutionally inapplicable because it offended against the principles of
order and fairness enunciated in Morguard.
3 6
Today, Canadian courts must, as a constitutional requirement,
give full faith and credit to judgments rendered in sister provinces when
the original Court had reasonable grounds for assuming jurisdiction,
defined in accordance with the broad principles of order and fairness.
There is no such constitutional requirement with respect to foreign
judgments3 7
35 Ibid. at 327-28.
3 6 Ibid. at 328-31. The Court also said, at 328:
Morguard requires that the rules of private international law must be adapted to the
structure of our federation. In a federation, we assume that there is more commonality
as to what is acceptable action; we have many common procedures. We even have similar
conflicts rules, related, for example, to jurisdiction and deference, and to procedures
regarding the lexfori. And courts are required, by constitutional restraints, to assume
jurisdiction-only where there are real and substantial connections to that place.
It would seem that on the basis of Ladore v. Bennett, [1939] A.C. 468 and Re Upper Churchill
Water Rights Reversion Act, supra note 34, the Quebec statute was not ultra vires.
37 For the impact of Hunt, see C. Walsh, "Conflict of Laws-Enforcement of Extra Provincial
Judgments and In Personam Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts: Hunt v. T& Npkc" (1994) 73 Can. Bar
Rev. 394, and C. Walsh, "Private International Law-Jurisdiction and Recognition of
Judgments--Hunt v. T&N plc" (1993-94) 10:2 Solic. J. -N.B. 17. For an attempt to bring Canadian
jurisdictional rules into line with the principles laid down in Morguard and Amchem, see Model
Uniform Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, App. B, reproduced in Uniform Law
Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the Seventy-Sixth Annual Meeting (1994), forthcoming.
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III. COMPLETING THE TASK: CHOICE OF LAW RULES FOR
INTERPROVINCIAL TORTS
Having subjected private international law rules dealing with the
jurisdiction of Canadian courts, procedural rules that impede the course
of interprovincial litigation, and the recognition and enforcement of
sister province judgments, to the constitutional shackles of order and
fairness, it was logical for the Supreme Court to attempt to subject
choice of law rules to these same principles. It would thereby complete
the task of constitutionalizing all aspects of private international law, a
process which began when it discovered an implied Full Faith and
Credit clause in the Canadian Constitution. The opportunity arose in
1993 with respect to the choice of law rule applicable to torts-one of
the most controversial topics of private international law.
From a constitutional point of view, the power to exercise
jurisdiction, on the basis of Morguard, does not automatically give the
provinces authority to apply the lex fori. If it is fair to cause a defendant
to be sued in the province on the basis of a real and substantial
connection, that connection may not necessarily be the same for choice
of law purposes. The application of the lexfori to the merits of the case,
especially with respect to liability and assessment of damages, must not
amount to an unconstitutional extraterritorial application of that law. It
must also be fair to both the plaintiff and the defendant: there must be a
sufficient nexus between the transaction that is the object of the
litigation and the forum as well as the parties. For instance, in litigation
involving a wrongful act committed outside the province by a forum
resident which causes injury to another forum resident, may the forum
apply its own law or is it constitutionally required to apply the law of the
place of wrong; in other words, to give full faith and credit to the laws of
that place? Would it not be fairer, at least with respect to some issues,
to apply the lex fori? Is the law of the place of wrong the law most
substantially connected so that the forum province must apply it? When
conflicting provincial interests are involved, and this is often the case in
the field of torts, the question arises as to when a province with a real
and substantial connection with the occurrence, transaction, or the
parties can apply its law and disregard the contrary existing interests of a
sister province that also has a real and substantial connection with the
occurrence, transaction, or the parties. Is there a constitutional duty to
defer to countervailing interests of other provinces? With respect to
choice of law, a higher quality of connection seems to be required than
for jurisdiction. The connection must be the most real and substantial
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connection, as different laws cannot be applied to the same tort in
different jurisdictions. Is it possible to determine with any degree of
certainty what is the most real and substantial connection? It is difficult
to give an objective answer to this question. It may vary depending upon
the issue involved. The interest of the province that has the most real
and substantial connection should prevail. If the forum were to apply its
own law and disregard the law of the province that is most substantially
connected to the issue before the Court, it would violate the implied Full
Faith and Credit clause. The application of the lex fori to a situation not
sufficiently connected with the province may also violate the principle of
territoriality. In its latest pronouncement, the Supreme Court held that
in the case of interprovincial torts the law of the place where the
accident occurred must be applied, thereby implying that it is the law
most substantially connected.
A. Background. Choice of Law Rules and Approaches to Torts in General
Before analyzing Tolofson v. Jensen and Lucas v. Gagnon, it is
important to refer very briefly to several major choice of law rules and
approaches to torts in.general that have been proposed by scholars or
used by the courts, especially in the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Australia, as they provide the necessary background to the decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada.
The last fifty years have witnessed fundamental changes in
theoretical approaches to choice of law, especially in tort cases, and
particularly in the United States. The doctrinal and methodological
battles that have been fought south of our borders have been largely
ignored by our courts. This isolationist attitude has enabled us to retain
traditional choice of law methodology and rules, and to avoid the
uncertainty unleashed by the American revolution which nurtured open-
ended approaches calling for individualized, ad hoc solutions for each
conflicts case without the aid of specific rules.38
1. The traditional lex loci delicti rule
Historically, beginning in the Middle Ages, the territorialist
approach, which subsequently found its expression in the vested rights
3 8 For a detailed analysis of theories and methodologies see Canadian Conflict of Laws, supra
note 18 at 20-56. As to the distinction between rules and approaches see W.LM. Reese, "Choice of
Law- Rules or Approach" (1972) 57 Cornell L Rev. 315.
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theory, resulted in the adoption of the lex loci delicti-law of the place of
injury-as the exclusive choice of law rule for torts in general. The law
of the place where a wrong is committed governs the rights of the person
injured and the liability of the wrongdoer. It determines whether a
person has sustained a legal injury.39 Most important is the definition of
the place of wrong. According to the Restatement of the Law of Conflict
of Laws: "The place of wrong is in the state where the last event
necessary to make the actor liable for an alleged tort takes place."
40
This is usually the place where the injury occurred, for there cannot be
liability without injury. This definition is victim-oriented. When defined
as the place of tortious conduct, it is tortfeasor-oriented. His or her
liability is determined by the standards of the environment in which he
or she acts and not by the standards of the environment where the victim
suffered damages. Of course, where the wrongful act and the injury
occur in the same state, the determination of the lex loci delicti is easy.
The lex loci delicti as the place of injury has been the preferred choice of
law rule of most European states41 and, until recently, of the United
States.
Thus: "(1) If a cause of action in tort is created at the place of
wrong, a cause of action will be recognized in other states. (2) If no
cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can
be had in any other state."42
Supporters of the lex loci delicti rule maintain that it promotes
uniformity of results, achieves certainty and predictability, is easy to
apply, discourages forum shopping, and is neutral since it does not
favour the victim or the wrongdoer. It also recognizes that the
consequences of a wrongful act are of primary interest to the state where
they have occurred.
The application of the law of the place of injury has the
advantage of facilitating the solution in situations where wrongful acts
occur in several states but the injury is suffered in only one state, or in
situations where several injuries are suffered in several states. This is
because it is always possible to apply distributively several laws to
different injuries resulting from the same wrongful act, whereas it is
39 Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws (St. Paul: American Law Institute, 1934) at § 378.
See also J.H. Beale, Conflict of Laws (New York. Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1935) vol. 2, c. 9, at § 377.2.
40 Iid. at § 377.
41 In regard to France, see H. Battifol & P. Lagarde, Droft internationalpriv, 7th ed., vol. 2
(Paris: labrairie gen6rale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1981) at s. 554ff.
42 Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, supra note 39 at § 384.
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impossible to apply different laws to the reparation of a single injury.
The notion of injury rather than wrongful act is the foundation of tort
liability, since civil liability may exist in the absence of fault but never in
the absence of injury.
Unfortunately, this traditional rule is neither sufficiently fact-
specific nor narrow enough to regulate a single issue in tort. It is too
broad, having been applied not only to liability but to the other aspects
of the cause of action, such as the measure and distribution of damages,
the existence or non-existence of a defense, contribution or indemnity
between tortfeasors, and the question of survival of the action.
Furthermore, unexplored areas have not been subjected to general
open-ended principles. No exceptions are provided.
The traditional rule has also been criticized for leading to
questionable results, even in cases in which the wrongful conduct and
the injury are localized in the same state, especially in guest statute and
interspousal or interfamilial immunity cases. Furthermore, the
determination of the place of harm or where the last event necessary to
make the actor liable for an alleged tort takes place is not always an easy
task, especially in cases of unfair competition, fraud, defamation, or
invasion of privacy.
Where the place of wrongful conduct or of injury is purely
fortuitous, the lex loci delicti does not achieve fairness to the parties.
This is particularly true in the case of automobile accidents when the
victim and the tortfeasor both reside in the forum or in the same foreign
jurisdiction. In some cases there may be uncertainty with respect to the
contents of the local law of the fortuitous place of injury.
To obviate the lack of any exceptions to or built-in escape clauses
in the statutory or judicial lex loci delicti rule, the courts have resorted to
escape devices such as characterization, renvoi, and public policy.43
2. The American revolution
Realizing that the exclusive application of the lex loci delicti rule
proved arbitrary in operation and most often was incapable of producing
certainty and predictability as well as fairness to the parties (since
concern for fairness to the local plaintiff does not necessarily address the
43 In the United States, some courts have applied the "better law," usually the lexfori as the
functional equivalent of the public policy exception to the application of foreign law. See, for
instance, Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205 (N.H. 1966); and Conklin v. Homer, 157 N.W.2d 579 (Visc.
1968).
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question of fairness to the defendant), some American courts have
applied a variety of approaches to foreign torts which were proposed by
academic writers to solve conflict of laws problems generally.
a) Interest analysis
According to the governmental interest analysis 44 pioneered by
the late Professor Currie, the governmental interest inherent in each
substantive rule of law determines the extent of application of that rule.
Each rule of substantive law is spatially conditioned so that the extent of
its application is found in the rule itself. Choice of law rules are not
involved:
For each issue in a case as to which the laws of the states involved are potentially in
conflict, the court is to apply the ordinary processes of construction and interpretation to
those laws in order to decide whether, in the light of the respective policies expressed in
the laws and of the circumstances of the case, the states involved would have an interest
in the application of their respective laws to that issue. If only one state has such an
interest, its law should be applied to the issue; if both have, the forum's law should be
applied. However, in determining whether the interests of two states are actually in
conflict, the forum should be prepared, when the circumstances warrant, to give a
moderate and restrained interpretation to the policy or interest of one state or the other
and thus avoid the confict.45
The central thrust of Currie's theory is his desire to effectuate the
policies of the forum.
American case law that uses interest analysis presents a
confusing picture, as the courts have found it difficult to apply,
especially when governmental interests cannot be identified.4
Instead of applying the lex fori as advocated by Currie, some
states, like California, when confronted with a true or unavoidable
conflict between the legitimate interests of two states, have employed a
comparative impairment approach to the resolution of the conflict. This
44 For a more detailed analysis, see Canadian Conflict of Laws, supra note 18 at 32-42.
45 Where only one state has an interest there is a false conflict: see, for instance, Griffith v.
UnitedAirlins Inc., 203 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1964); and Wldliams v. Rawlings Tuck Line, Inc., 357 F.2d 581
(D.C. Cir. 1965). Where both states have an interest there is a true conflict: see, for instance, Foster
v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. CA 1972). In regard to reinterpreting state policies or interests in
order to avoid conflicts, see: D.F. Cavers, The Choice of Law Process (Ann Arbor University of
Michigan Press, 1965) at 63-64; B. Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1963); and B. Currie, "Case Comment on Babcock v. Jackson" 63 Col. L.
Rev. 1233.
46 For an analysis of the case law, see E.F. Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Laws, 2d ed. (St. Paul:
west Publishing, 1992) at 590-94.
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approach seeks to determine, "[w]hich state's interest would be more
impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other
state."47
The comparative impairment approach is essentially one of
allocation of the respective spheres of law-making influences. It involves
several steps. First, the states with relevant interests must be identified
(for instance, the state of the principal place of business, the state of the
place of injury, and the state of the domicile or residence of the parties).
Second, the Court must attempt to determine the relative commitment
of each interested state to the law involved. This means examining the
current status of that law and the intensity of interest with which it is
held, and also the comparative pertinence of the law; that is, the fit
between the purpose of the legislation and the situation in the case at
hand. Only then will it be possible for the court to determine which law
should be applied.48
b) The -most significant relationship of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws: The Proper Law of a Tort
The Restatement (Second) declares that, as a general principle:
"(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in
tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to
that issue, has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and
the parties under the principles stated in section 6."49
These principles, factors, or choice-influencing considerations
relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the
forum, (c) the relevant policies of oth r interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified
expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty,
4 7 Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Ca. 1976) at 723, cert. den. 429 U.S. 859.
48 Note that the Louisiana conflicts codification of 1991 provides for the application of the law
of the state "where policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to that
issue": Civil Code, Art. 3515, para. (1); and Art. 3542, para. (1). See also, S.C. Symeonides,
"Louisiana's New Law of Choice of Law for Torts Conflicts: An Exegesis" (1992) 66 Tul. L. Rev.
677; and RJ. Weintraub, "The Contributions of Symeonides and Kozyris in Making Choice of Law
Predictable and Just: An Appreciation and Critique" (1990) 38 Am. J. Comp. L 511.
49 Restatement of the Law (Second): Conflict of Laws 2d., vol. I (St. Paul: American Law
Institute, 1971) at § 145(1).
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predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application
of the law to be applied. 0
Of these factors, (a), (b), (c), (e), and (g) assume greater importance in
the field of torts than factors (d) and (f).
Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of
section 6 are as follows:
(a) The place where the injuryoccurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of
the parties, and
(d) the placewhere the relationship, if any, between the parties is entered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to
the particular issue.
51
The contacts listed indicate the states that are most likely to be
interested in the decision of the particular issue before the court. Once
consideration is given to the relevant policies of all potentially interested
states, the court is able to apply section 6 and determine the local law of
the state that, with respect to each issue before the court, has the most
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.
No particular weight or priority is given to these contacts or to
the principles of section 6, nor is guidance given as to how a court should
analyze the "relative interests." However, the place of wrong continues
to play a significant role.5 2 More precise rules are given for different
torts and for different tort issues. They do not depart from the general
principles. They are merely intended to give some guidance to the
courts as to which local law has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties 3
It is interesting to note that one of the reasons given in support
of this new approach is that, "[s]tate and national boundaries are of less
significance today by reason of the increased mobility of our population
and of the increasing tendency of men to conduct their affairs across
boundary lines."5 4
50bid. at § 6(2).
51 ]bid. at § 145(2).
52 ibid. at §§ 145(2)(a),(b), 146, 156-160, 162, 164-66, and 172.
53 See ibid. at § 146, regarding personal injuries. Preference is given to the place of injury.
54 ibid. at 413.
1995]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
No indication is given that a different approach should be used
when dealing with an issue in tort involving a sister state because of the
Full Faith and Credit and the Due Process clauses in the United States
Constitution. In an interstate situation the Court of the forum may
apply the law of any state, including its own law, that is significantly
related to the issue. Therefore, "[d]ue [pl]rocess reduces to the single
consideration: what constitutes sufficient connection with the
transaction so that application of forum law is permissible?" 55 The
same holds true for the Full Faith and Credit clause. The American
Supreme Court does not involve itself in the choice of law process so
long as the forum has minimal contacts to support the application of the
lex fori:
Where more than one State has sufficiently substantial contact with the activity in
question, the forum State, by analysis of the interests possessed by the States involved,
could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the law of one or another state
having such interest in the multistate activity.5 6
An analysis of the American decisions57 that have used the
Restatement (Second) approach, also called the proper law of a tort,58
indicates that, in general, the objective of justice in the particular case
has taken precedence over the objective of uniformity and predictability
of result 5 9 Some American courts have.questioned modem approaches
on the ground of lack of uniformity and predictability of result. They are
wary of approaches applied in an ad hoc fashion. In their search for
principled rules, they have considered favourably the choice of law rules
proposed by Fuld C.J. of the New York Court of Appeals in Tooker v.
55 See Scoles & Hay, supra note 46 at 89, § 3.23, which is based on Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague, 101 S.Ct. 633 (1981).
56 Richards v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 585 (1962) at 594. See also Scoles & Hay, supra note 46
at 93, § 3.24: "By this analysis, the Supreme Court permits the states significantly related to the
parties or the issue to adopt whatever choice of law provisions suit their needs. The only real
constitutional limitation is that the law chosen be the law of a state having some significant 'contact'
or relation with the transaction." And see § 3.26.
5 7 See, for instance, Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); and Scoles & Hay, ibid. at §
17.23ff.
58 See J.H.C. Morris, "The Proper Law of a Tort" (1951) 64 Harv. L Rev. 881, a pioneer
work.
59 For a critical analysis of the proper law of a tort and the Restatement (Second), see
Canadian Conflict of Laws, supra note 18 at 47-54, including the principle of proximity. See also
632-37.
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Lopez60 and applied in Neumeier v. Kuehner'61-a guest statute case
brought by a non-New York plaintiff on the ground that such rules
injected uniformity and predictability in the Restatement (Second)
approach to tortious liability.
It remains to be seen whether these rules will be widely accepted
and extended to other tort situations. What emerges from Neumeier v.
Kuehner is that in tort cases "significant contacts are, almost exclusively,
the parties' domiciles and the locus of the tort."62
3. The English common law choice of law rule
The English common law choice of law rule for torts combines
the law of the forum and the law of the place where the wrong was
committed. It has its origin in the following passage in the judgment of
Willes J. delivered in 1870 in Phillips v. Eyre:63
As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England for a wrong alleged to have been
committed abroad, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the wrong must be of such a
character that it would have been actionable if committed in England. ... Secondly, the act
must not have been justifiable by the law of the place where it was done. 64
60 249 N.E.2d 394 at 404 (N.Y. CA 1969).
61 286 N.E.2d 454 at 457-58 (N.Y. CA 1972), appeal after remand 349 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1973):
1. when the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same state, and the
car is there registered, the law of that state should control and determine the standard of
care which the host owes to his guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that state does not
cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be held liable by reason of the fact
that liability would be imposed upon him under the tort law of the state of the victim's
domicile. Conversely, when the guest was injured in the state of his own domicile and its
law permits recovery, the driver who has come into that state should not-in the absence
of special circumstances-be permitted to interpose the law of his state as a defense.
3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in different states,
the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the applicable rule of decision will be
that of the state where the accident occurred but not if it can be shown that displacing the
normally applicable rule will advance the relevant substantive law purposes without
impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or producing great uncertainty
for litigants.
62 Schultz v. Boy Scouts ofAmerica, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679 at 684 (N.Y. 1985). The Court stated
that these rules are applicable to all torts in which the conflicting rules are loss-distribution rules
rather than conduct-regulating rules. See also Cooney v. Osgood Machinery, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277
(N.Y. 1993) in which the law of the placepf injury was applied.
63 [1870] 6 Q.B. 1.
64 Did. at 28-29.
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A plaintiff seeking to recover damages in England for a tort
created by the domestic law of the place where it was committed must
establish that, had the defendant's act been committed in England, it
would have constituted an actionable tort by English domestic law65 and
that the act was not justifiable by the law of the place where it was done.
For a long time, English courts interpreted the words "not
justifiable" to mean "not legally innocent." It was not necessary that the
defendant's conduct be civilly actionable as a tort by the law of the place
of wrong as long as it was merely criminal by that law.66
This interpretation was widely criticized, particularly on the
grounds that it did not take sufficient account of the law of the place of
tort, and did not provide enough flexibility to ensure justice in the
individual case: a civil remedy could be granted in England to the
plaintiff when none was available in the place of wrong, thus
encouraging forum shopping.
It was not until 1971 that the House of Lords, in Boys v.
Chaplin,67 decided to take these criticisms seriously into account and
modify the rule in Phillips v. Eyre. Although it is difficult to extract the
true ratio from the judgments of their Lordships, it is generally accepted
that the case is authority for two propositions:
First, the rule inPhillips v. Eyre is modified so that it now has to be asked whether the
conduct of the defendant is actionable, rather than not justifiable, by the law of the place
of the tort. Second, the rule is one which is to be applied "with flexibility." Emphasis was
placed by the House of Lords on the qualification by Willes . in Phillips v. Eyre that his
conditions apply "as a general rule." This was seized upon as a justification for diverging
from the rule in Phillip v.Eyre when the special circumstances so demand. 68
The words "not justifiable" now mean "actionable" by the domestic law
of the place where the tort was committed, in the sense of imposing civil
liability on the defendant.
The first limb of the rule, which places undue emphasis on the lex
fori, is often unfair to the plaintiff who has to find a forum which
65 The Halley (1868), 2 P.C. 193.
66 Machado v.Fontes, [1897] 2 Q.B. 231.
67 [1971] A.C. 356.
68 P.M. North & JJ. Fawcett, Cheshire and North's Private International Law, 12th ed.
(London: Butterworths, 1992) at 535.
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recognizes the cause of action. Although its abolition has been
recommended by the Law Commissions,69 it is still the rule in England.70
The general rule of double actionability is subject to an
exception based on the Restatement (Second).71 It reflects the desire of a
majority of their Lordships in Boys v. Chaplin72 to introduce some
flexibility into the choice of law rule. As a result, a particular issue may
be governed by the law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has
the most significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties.
Although their Lordships did not intend to adopt the general concept of
the proper law of a tort,73 English courts have not hesitated to endorse it
as an exception. 74 The Law Commissions have also proposed a proper
law exception to the lex loci delicti, which calls for the application of the
law of the "country or territory with which the tort or delict had the most
real and substantial connection." 75
4. Interstate torts in Australia
In Australia, a majority of the High Court in Breavington v.
Godleman76 held that the rule in Phillips v. Eyre, which had been
followed in that country generally, did not apply to interstate torts, even
as modernized by the views expressed by some Law Lords in Boys v.
Chaplin.77
Braevington v. Godleman dealt with a provision of the law of the
Northern Territory, the place of commission of the tort, which imposed
a limitation on the types of heads of damages recoverable in torts. The
issue was whether that provision should be applied instead of the law of
Victoria, where the action was brought, which had no such limitations.
69 U.K, Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law: Choice of
Law in Tort and Delict (London: H.M.S.O., 1990) at 9, para. 2.11.
70 Metall und RohstoffAG v. Donaldson Lufldn & Jenrette Inc., [1990] 1 Q.B. 391 at 392-93.
71 Supra note 51 at § 145.
72 Especially Lord Hodson, at 378, and Lord Wiberforce, at 389-93, supra note 69.
73 Ibid. at 381, 383, 405-06.
74 See, for instance, Couplandv.Arabian Gulf Petroleum Co., [1983] 3 All E.R. 226.
75 Supra note 69 at 14, para. 3.13.
76 (1988), 80 A.LR. 362.
77See generally ibid.
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The majority78 was of the opinion that the correct law to govern an
alleged cause of action in the case of an interstate tort is the law of the
place of commission of the tort. This rule is not subject to any exception
"in regard to 'inflexibility,' degree of close relationship of the persons or
events involved or occurring on any other considerations. ' 79 Their
Lordships based their decision on the Full Faith and Credit clause of the
Australian Constitution"0 and the principle of territoriality. With
respect to foreign torts, Phillips v. Eyre continues to prevail.81
5. Canada
As Professor Hogg has observed, "[p]roblems of choice of law
are not usually seen as raising constitutional questions,"8 2 at least not
until Tolofson v. Jensen and Lucas v. Gagnon.
For the last fifty years, in the area of interprovincial and
international torts, Canadian courts have followed the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in McLean v. Pettigrew,83 which had applied
the general rule in Phillips v. Eyre as modified by Machado v. Fontes. In
McLean v. Pettigrew, both the wrongful act and the injury occurred in
Ontario. The victim was a gratuitous passenger in an automobile driven
and owned by the wrongdoer. Both parties resided in Quebec and the
78 Wilson, Gaudron, and Deane JJ. Note that Mason CJ., also in favour of the lex loci delcti,
would consider an exception in favour of the law of another place where that place has the closest
and most real relationship to the factual situation: ibid at 371.
79 E.I. Sykes & M.C. Pryles, Australian Pivate International Law, 3d ed. (Sydney: Law Book
Company Limited, 1991) at 565.
80 Commonwealth ofAustralia Constitution Act, 1900 (U.K.), 63 & 64 Vict., c. 3, s. 118. The
High Court relied on a unitary system of law and section 118 of the Australian Constitution which
provides that "Full faith and credit shall be given, throughout the Commonwealth, to the laws,
public Acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of every State." Wilson and Gaudron J3.
stated, supra note 78 at 386:
By the constitutional subjection of the Constitutions, the powers and laws of the States to
s. 118, the consequence was effected that the one set of facts occurring in a State would
be adjudged by only one body of law and thus give rise to only one legal consequence,
regardless of where in the Commonwealth the matter fell for adjudication.
For an analysis and criticism of the constitutional aspects of the case, see Sykes & Pryles, ibid.
at 325-35.
81 See Sykes & Pryles, ibid. at 565, para 1.5.2(3).
82 Supra note 6 at 335.
83 [1945] S.C.R. 62. For earlier cases see O'Connorv. Wray, [1930] S.C.R. 231; and Canadian
National Steamship Co. v. Watson, [1939] C.LR. 11. As well, the common law rule was held to apply
to Quebec.
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automobile was registered and insured in that province. If the wrongful
act and injury had occurred in Quebec, the wrongdoer would have been
liable for the damages suffered by the gratuitous passenger, whereas in
Ontario, at that time and in those circumstances, the wrongdoer would
not have been liable. The gratuitous passenger brought her action in
Quebec to recover damages for her injuries. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada, it was held that since the wrongdoer had driven in a
careless manner in breach of Ontario's Highway Traffic Act,8 4 this
wrongful act was not justifiable under the lex loci delicti. The act being
civilly actionable by the lexfori, she was able to recover.
In order to prevent injustices that could result from a strict
adherence to McLean v. Pettigrew, some Canadian courts, after pointing
out that in both Phillips v. Eyre and McLean v. Pettigrew their Lordships,
when referring to the applicable rule, had used the prefatory words "[a]s
a general rule," and "under these conditions," proceeded to identify the
situations in which it should not be applied. In McLean v. Pettigrew, the
second limb of the general rule did not cause an injustice to the parties
as they were all residents of Quebec. The same result could have been
reached by applying the doctrine of the proper law of the tort. On the
other hand, the application of that rule would have been unjust to the
wrongdoer in Grimes v. Cloutier.8 5 In that case the victim, a resident of
Ontario, while riding as a passenger in an automobile registered and
insured in Ontario and driven by an Ontario resident, sustained personal
injuries as a result of a collision in Quebec with an automobile registered
and insured in that province driven by a resident of Quebec. The driver
of the Quebec automobile had been found guilty of driving in breach of
Quebec's Highway Code8 6 at the time of the collision. The passenger
had received benefits in satisfaction of all amounts payable to her in
accordance with the provisions of Quebec's Automobile Insurance Act,
87
which, as a result of a 1978 agreement between Quebec and Ontario,88
are part of Ontario's Standard Automobile Policy.89 She then brought an
action in Ontario for common law damages against the driver of the
automobile and its owner, both residents of Quebec, in order to obtain
84 R.S.O. 1937, c. 288, now R.S.O. 1990, c. H-8.
85 (1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 641 (CA).
86 p.S.Q. 1977, c. C-24, s. 83.
8 7 S.Q. 1977, c. 68, now R.S.Q. 1977, c. A-25.
88 Agreement with the Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations for the province of
Ontario, Dec. 27,1978.
89 R.S.O. 1970, c. 224, as am. by Reg. 1004-78, now R.S.O. 1990, c. I-8.
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more than is provided by the Quebec insurance scheme, which prohibits
any action in the courts. On the basis of the "punishable" gloss of the
second limb of the general rule, she would have succeeded.
However, the Ontario Court of Appeal did not apply that gloss.
Since the Quebec residents were not civilly liable, her claim was held to
fail. The Court pointed out that the application of the Ontario law was
not within the reasonable expectations of the parties. Because she had
received benefits under Quebec law, it would be unjust to compensate
her again. To do so would also encourage forum shopping. The Court
of Appeal did not reject the second limb of the general rule entirely,
since it recognized that
[w]hatever weakness there may be in the interpretative reasoning in Machado v. Fontes, a
countervailing consideration should also be noted: as a matter of policy an inflexible rule
that the absence of civil liability in the place where the alleged tort took place is a valid
defence can, in some cases, lead to an unjust result.90
The defendants, as residents of Quebec, were legally entitled to
the protection of that province's automobile insurance compensation
scheme. It would have been unjust to subject them to the law of the
forum and so destroy their reasonable expectations of the legal
consequences of their conduct. As for the victim, it would be difficult to
believe that she would have had any reasonable expectation that Ontario
law would apply to the exclusion of Quebec law with respect to any
automobile accident occurring in Quebec. This approach gave great
weight to the place of the accident.
The Court of Appeal also pointed out that interprovincial comity
requires one province, when applying its laws, not to ignore the policies
of another province as expressed in its legislation. Machado v. Fontes
could still be used in some cases to achieve individual justice. Although
the Ontario Court of Appeal did not adopt the doctrine of the proper
law of a tort either as a general rule or as an exception, it was concerned
with identifying the contacts that were the most significant in the
particular situation in order to displace the general rule. Thus, for a
time Canadian courts were in disarray, some adhering to McLean v.
Pettigrew, others favouring either the lex loci delicti or the lex fori,
depending upon the residence of the partiesYl
9 0 Supra note 83 at 649. See also Bowes v. Chalifour (1992), 18 C.P.C. (3d) 391 (Ont. Gen.
Div.), where the Court applied the law having the most significant relationship with the occurrence
and the parties.
91 For a survey, see Canadian Conflict of Laws, supra note 18 at 645.
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In the latest edition of my treatise, after some hesitation with
respect to the requirement of actionability by the lex fori caused by
concern about forum shopping, I expressed the view that the present
English approach was a good model. The general choice of law rule
should be double civil actionability subject to the exception that a
particular issue between the parties may be governed by the law of the
jurisdiction which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant
relationship with the occurrence and the parties:
Such a rule combines the objectives of certainty and flexibilityin the interest of individual
justice. The exception should be invoked only in special circumstances where, after
examination of the policy underlying the law which may be applied and the interests of
the parties to be affected, it is clear that the !ex loci delicti has no real connection with the
proceeding, in order to enable a plaintiff to recover damages available in the lexfori but
not available in the ex loci delicti. This requirement should do much to alleviate any fears
that unacceptable uncertainty willbe introduced in this area of the law.
92
Having been impressed by the reasoning of Mason C.J. in
Breavington v. Godleman,93 I suggested that:
In the case of interprovincial torts, the flexible exception should not be invoked to avoid
the application of the law of the province where the wrong occurred especially when the
residence of the parties or of the defendant is in that province. To apply some other law, for
instance, the lex fori in the name of flexibility would not be conducive to uniform
enforceability of liability for torts occurring within Canada.
9 4
Paraphrasing His Lordship somewhat, I added:
When Canadian residents travel from one province or territory to another they are
conscious of moving from one legal regime to another in the same country and aware that
there are differences between the two which may impinge in some way on their rights,
duties and liabilities. It may come as no surprise to them to find that the local law
governs their rights and liabilities in respect of any wrong they did or any wrong they
suffered in a province or territory. In these circumstances, there is a stronger case for
looking to the lex loci delicti as the governing law for the purpose of determining the
substantive rights and liabilities of the parties in respect of a tort committed within
Canada. In a federation, an individual should not be exposed to the injustice of being
subjected to the requirements of contemporaneously valid but inconsistent laws. In the
absence of some relevant overriding territorial nexus, one province must not be able to
attach legal liability for conduct and consequences which are wholly within the territory
of another province, nor can it refuse to recognize or apply the substantive law of that
other province in relation to that conduct and those consequences. Interprovincial
comity requires such an attitude.
95
92 Ibid. at 661.
93 Supra note 78 at 372.
94 Supra note 18 at 661 [emphasis added].
95 Ibid.
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The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Tolofson v. Jensen and
Lucas v. Gagnon constitutes a vindication of these views.
B. The Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada: Appreciation and
Critique
1. General approach
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Tolofson v.
Jensen and Lucas v. Gagnon96 is a good example of an unnecessary
attempt to constitutionalize the common law choice of law rule
applicable to interprovincial torts. Both cases are concerned with
automobile accidents involving residents of other provinces.
In Tolofson v. Jensen, a young passenger in a car owned and
driven by his father was seriously injured when it collided with a vehicle
driven by Mr. Jensen. The accident occurred in Saskatchewan. The
Tolofsons were residents of British Columbia where the automobile was
registered and insured. Mr. Jensen was a resident of Saskatchewan and
his vehicle was registered and insured in that province. The victim
brought an action in British Columbia against his father and Mr. Jensen
seeking damages for his injuries. At the time of the accident, the action
was barred in Saskatchewan under that province's statute of limitations
but was not barred in British Columbia. Furthermore, at that time,
according to Saskatchewan law, a gratuitous passenger could not recover
unless wilful or wanton misconduct by the driver of the vehicle in which
he or she was a passenger could be established.9 7 No such rule existed in
British Columbia. The victim sought to avoid the limitation period and
the higher standard of care in the jurisdiction where the accident
occurred by bringing his action in a province that was free of these
restrictions.
In Lucas v. Gagnon, Mrs. Gagnon brought an action on her own
behalf and as litigation guardian of her two children against her husband
for personal injuries suffered as a result of a collision which occurred in
the Province of Quebec between an automobile driven by her husband in
which she was a passenger, and an automobile owned and operated by
Mr. Lavoie, a resident of Quebec whose vehicle was registered and
insured there. The Gagnons were residents of Ontario and their vehicle
9 6 Supra note 1.
97 Both laws were subsequently modified to remove these restrictions.
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was registered and insured in that province. Although, originally, Mrs.
Gagnon joined Mr. Lavoie as defendant, she discontinued her action
against him. However, Mr. Gagnon cross-claimed against Mr. Lavoie
for contribution and indemnity should he be held liable to the victims.
Mrs. Lavoie obtained no-fault benefits from Mr. Gagnon's Ontario
insurer, who was reimbursed by the R6gie de l'assurance automobile du
Qu6bec, pursuant to the 1978 agreement between Quebec and
Ontario.98 Since she could not bring an action for damages in Quebec,
she decided to sue in Ontario to obtain greater compensation.
In both Tolofson and Lucas, it was necessary to decide which law
should be applied to determine the liability of the defendant-drivers.
Tolofson also raised the important subsidiary issue of characterization of
the limitation period.
After reviewing the historical development of the Anglo-
Canadian choice of law rule in tort, La Forest J., speaking on behalf of
the majority of the Supreme Court, observed that it had "been applied
with insufficient reference to the underlying reality in which [it]
operate[s] and to general principles that should apply ... to that
reality."99 On the international plane, the relevant underlying reality is
the territorial limits of law in the international legal order. Although the
courts in the various states will, in certain circumstances, exercise
jurisdiction on matters that may have originated in other states so that
individuals need not, in enforcing a legal right, be tied to the courts of
the jurisdiction wh~re the right arose, rules have been developed for
restricting the exercise of jurisdiction over extraterritorial and
transnational transactions. Once the Court has properly taken
jurisdiction on the basis of a real and substantial connection with the
subject matter of the litigation, what substantive law should it apply? La
Forest J.'s answer was as follows:
From the general principle that a state has exclusive jurisdiction within its own territories
and that other states must under principles of comity respect the exercise of its
jurisdiction within its own territory, it seems axiomatic to me that, at least as a general
rule, the law to be applied in torts is the law of the place where the activity occurred, i.e.,
the lex loci delicti. There are situations, of course, notably where an act occurs in one
place but the consequences are directly felt elsewhere, when the issue of where the tort
takes place itself raises thorny issues. In such a case, it may well be that the consequences
would be held to constitute the wrong. Difficulties may also arise where the wrong
directly arises out of some transnational or interprovincial activity. There territorial
considerations may become muted; they may conflict and other considerations may play a
determining role. But that is not this case. Though the parties may, before and after the
98 Supra note 91.
99 Tolofson, supra note 1 at 17, para. 35.
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wrong was suffered, have travelled from one province to another, the defining activity
that constitutes the wrong took place wholly within the territorial limits of one province,
in one case, Quebec, in the other Saskatchewan, and the resulting injury occurred there
as well. That being so it seems to me, barring some recognized exception, to which
possi'bility I will turn later, that as Willes 3. pointed out in Phillips v. Eyre, supra, at p. 28,
"civil liability arising out of a wrong derives its birth from the law of the place [where it
occurred], and its character is determined by that law." In short, the wrong is governed
by that law. It is in that law that we must seek its defining character, it is that law, too,
that defines its legal consequences.
100
His Lordship then proceeded to give a list of the usual arguments in
favour of the 1ex loci delicti:
I have thus far framed the arguments favouring the lex loci delicti in theoretical terms.
But the approach responds to a number of sound practical considerations. The rule has
the advantage of certainty, ease of application and predictability. Moreover, it would
seem to meet normal expectations. Ordinarily people expect their activities to be
governed by the law of the place where they happen to be and expect that concomitant
legal benefits and responsibilities will be defined accordingly. The government of that
place is the only one with power to deal with these activities. The same expectation is
ordinarily shared by other states and by people outside the place where an activity occurs.
If other states routinely applied their laws to activities taking place elsewhere, confusion
would be the result. In our modern world of easy travel and with the emergence of a
global economic order, chaotic situations would often result if the principle of territorial
jurisdiction were not, at least generally, respected. Stability of transactions and well
grounded legal expectations must be respected. Many activities within one state
necessarily have impact in another, but a multiplicity of competing exercises of state
power in respect of such activities must be avoided.101
It is obvious that the law of the place of accident must determine
the standard of conduct, for instance whether the driver of an
automobile should drive on the right- or on the left-hand side of the
road. But with respect to other issues arising out of a tort, for instance
loss distribution, the arguments supporting the application of the lex loci
delicti are less convincing. However, La Forest J. was right when he
stated that in McLean v. Pettigrew the application of the lexfori infringes
the territoriality principle. It invites forum shopping by litigants in
search of the most beneficial place to litigate an issue. Although some
social considerations may have militated in favour of the Anglo-
Canadian rule in the 19th century, for instance the difficulty of proving
the law of far-off countries,102 these considerations are no longer
100 Ibid. at 20, para. 42.
101 Ibid. at 20, para. 43.
102 This is not a good example as under McLean v. Pettigrew, supra note 83 and Machado v.
Fontes, supra note 66 it was still necessary to prove that under the law of the place of tort the act was
unjustifiable. If that was not possible, the lexfori applied.
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relevant. Therefore, the Supreme Court decided to overrule McLean v.
Pettigrew.
Addressing the issue of actionability of the wrong by the lexfori,
the Court came to the conclusion shared, as noted earlier, by the Law
Commissions, that it should not be part of the choice of law rule for torts
as it is "a factor better weighed in considering the issue of forum non
conveniens or, on the international plane, whether entertaining the
action would violate the public policy of the forum."
103
2. Constitutionalization of the lex loci delicti?
In the course of his opinion La Forest J. proceeded to examine
the policies behind the opinions of the majority of the Australian High
Court in Breavington v. Goderman,104 which, it will be recalled,
"favoured the view that, while different approaches might be taken in
the international arena, within Australia the choice of law rule should be
the lex loci delicti."105 Although His Lordship recognized that principles
of Australian constitutional law could not be directly transported into
Canada, he acknowledged that as "so much of the history and the social,
practical and constitutional environment is of a nature akin to those with
which we are faced in dealing with conflicts of laws within this
country," 1° 6 the majority's observations must be accorded considerable
weight.
As noted earlier, in my treatise, I had supported the exclusive
application of the lex loci delicti rule to interprovincial torts not on the
basis of the majority's arguments, but because I believed it was a
reasonable rule in the Canadian context.
107
La Forest I. stated:
The nature of our constitutional arrangements-a single country with different provinces
exercising territorial legislative jurisdiction-would seem to me to support a rule that is
certain and that ensures that an act committed in one part of this country will be given
103 Supra note 1 at 23, para. 50.
104 See Mason CJ. at 372, Wilson and Gaudron JJ. at 379, and Deane J. at 404. For an
incisive criticism of the High Court's constitutional position, see Sykes & Pryles, supra note 81 at
325-35. They argue, at 330, that "state legislation should be treated as being obliged to conform to
common law conflictual constraints in order to get the benefit of full faith and credit recognition in
another state" [emphasis in original].
105 Tolofson, supra note 1 at 29, para. 67.
106 Ibid.
107Supra note 18 at 661.
1995]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the same legal effect throughout the country. This militates strongly in favour of the lex
loci delicti rule. In this respect, given the mobility of Canadians and the many common
features in the law of the various provinces as well as the essentially unitary nature of
Canada's court system, I do not see the necessity of an invariable rule that the matter also
be actionable in the province of the forum. That seems to me to be a factor to be
considered in determining whether there is a real and substantial connection to the forum
to warrant its exercise of jurisdiction. Any problems that might arise could, I should
think, be resolved by a sensitive application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.10 8
Although he was of the opinion that this approach has the
advantage of unquestionable conformity to the Canadian Constitution,
he was much more careful in his choice of words than he had been in
Hunt, as in the present case the constitutional problems were not
adverted to in the courts below. He added:
Unless the courts' power to create law in this area exists independently of provincial
power, subject or not to federal power to legislate under its residuary power-ideas that
have been put forth by some of the Australian judges in Breavington v. Godleman, supra,
but never, so far as I know, in Canada-then the courts would appear to be limited in
exercising their powers to the same extent as the provincial legislatures;109
and concluded:
If a court is thus confined, it is obvious that an extensive concept of "proper law of the
tort" might well give rise to constitutional difficulties. Thus an attempt by one province
to impose liability for negligence in respect of activities that have taken place wholly in
another province by residents of the latter or, for that matter, residents of a third
province, would give rise to serious constitutional concerns. Such legislation applying
solely to the forum province's residents would appear to have more promise. However, it
is arguable that it is not constitutionally permissible for both the province where certain
activities took place and the province of the residence of the parties to deal with civil
liability arising out of the same activities. Assuming both provinces have legislative power
in such circumstances, this would open the possibility of conflicting rules in respect of the
same incident. I go no further regarding the possible resolution of these problems. What
these considerations indicate, however, is that the wiser course would appear to be for
the Court to avoid devising a rule that may possibly raise intractable constitutional
problems.11 0
This cautious approach to the interplay of choice of law rules and
constitutional imperatives seems to indicate that the Supreme Court may
not be ready to entrench the lex loci delicti in the Constitution. It may be
correct to declare that a statutory or judicial rule violates the principles
of order and fairness or that, in interprovincial torts, the application of
the lex fori to liability and the assessment of damages may in some
circumstances constitute an extraterritorial application of that law. Yet,
108 Tolofson, supra note 1 at 30, para. 69.
109 bid. at 31, para. 71.
110 bid.
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a declaration that Canadian courts must, in accordance with an implied
Full Faith and Credit clause, apply the lex loci delicti to interprovincial
torts, might usurp the power of the provincial legislatures and result in
the formulation of a federal common law rule of choice of law for
interprovincial tort cases without the express support of the Constitution
or a legitimate federal policy or interest. It is one thing to declare that,
for the law of the forum to be applied, the Constitution requires the
existence of a real and substantial connection or minimum contacts to
that forum; it is another to declare that the lex loci delicti is the rule
applicable to interprovincial torts. In other words, is there an overriding
necessity for uniformity which requires uniform federal choice of law
rules for interprovincial torts? Even if such federal interest exists for the
reasons stated by La Forest J., can it not be solved by provincial rules of
choice of law? In a federal state, only a minimum level of uniformity is
desirable. Diversity among its constituent members must be preserved,
especially in Canada, even if residual powers rest with the federal
authority. This is particularly important with respect to Quebec's Civil
Code which contains a rule that, with respect to interprovincial torts, is
partly different from the one adopted by the Supreme Court.
Article 3126 of Quebec's Civil Code provides as follows:
The obligation to make reparation for injury caused to another is governed by the law of
the country where the injurious act occurred. However, if the injury appeared in another
country, the law of the latter country is applicable if the person who committed the
injurious act should have foreseen that the damage would occur.
In any case where the person who committed the injurious act and the victim have their
domiciles or residences in the same country, the law of that country applies.
1 1 1
The first sentence of the first paragraph, which contains the
general rule, is in conformity with the decision of the Supreme Court.
This may also be the case with respect to the second sentence, since it is
more concerned with the determination of the place of the wrong than
the creation of an exception to the general rule. La Forest J. has
indicated that he may be prepared to adopt the place of injury as the
place of tort when the place of wrong and the place of injury are not the
same.
The second paragraph flies in the face of the rule adopted by the
Supreme Court and could be declared constitutionally invalid if the lex
loci delicti is constitutionally mandated for interprovincial torts. Since I
111 For an analysis of this article, see J.A. Talpis & J.-G. Castel, "Le Code Civil du Qu6bec,
Interpretation des r~gles du droit international priv6" in La Rifonne du Code Civil, vol. 3 (Sainte-
Foy, P.Q.: Les Presses de l'Universit6 Laval, 1993) 807; and H.P. Glenn, "Droit International
Priv," ibid. at 671.
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do not think that this should be the case, the application of the law of the
common residence or domicile of the parties, be it the lexfori or some
other law, can be justified constitutionally under Morguard. The
question is always the same: is the applicable law really and substantially
connected to the occurrence and the parties? The law of the common
domicile or residence of the parties may be the law most substantially
connected, especially with respect to loss distribution, when the place of
tort is purely fortuitous and therefore not most relevant except to the
extent of determining the conduct of the wrongdoer. This indicates how
difficult it is to apply a single law to all issues of torts. Conduct-
regulating rules must be governed by the law of the place of acting. But
what about other issues? Morguard seems to require the application of a
law that has minimum contacts with the issue before the Court.
The decision of the Supreme Court should not be given
constitutional stature. It simply modifies the common law rule by
overruling McLean v. Pettigrew and replacing it by the exclusive
application of the lex loci delicti to interprovincial torts. Therefore,
Quebec is free to modify the old rule legislatively or judicially as long as
the new rule does not violate the real and substantial connection
required by Morguard. The test is whether the application of the lex fori
or some other law would deny full faith and credit to the law of the place
of tort. Is it fair to the parties? I would answer in the affirmative but
only if, in the circumstances, the lex loci delicti is a better connection.
When the place of the accident is purely fortuitous, the law of the
common residence or domicile of the parties is the better connection.
The territorial reach of provincial power and fairness to
individuals in the exercise of that power do not require the exclusive
application of the lex loci delicti. The implied Full Faith and Credit
clause directs the forum to apply the law of a province that is interested
in the transaction, not necessarily the law of the place of tort. This is
what is meant by respect for the sovereignty of sister provinces. The
Supreme Court should limit its constitutional role to setting limits on a
province or its courts applying its domestic law to situations that have no
real or substantial connection with the province. The place of tort is not
such a limit.
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3. Exceptions
Should there be exceptions to the exclusive application of the lex
loci delicti? With respect to foreign torts La Forest J. stated:
There may be room for exceptions but they would need to be very carefully defined. It
seems to me self evident, for example, that State A has no business in defining the legal
rights and liabilities of citizens of State B in respect of acts in their own country, or for
that matter the actions in State B of citizens of State C, and it would lead to unfair and
unjust results if it did. The same considerations apply as between the Canadian
provinces. What is really debatable is whether State A, or for that matter Province A,
should be able to do so in respect of transactions in other states or provinces between its
own citizens or residents.
112
The last sentence refers to the situation covered by the second
paragraph of article 3126 of Quebec's Civil Code. Can a province apply
its law to its own citizens and residents with respect to a tort committed
outside the province? La Forest J. answered the question by pointing
out that the rule in McLean v. Pettigrew, which in that situation gave
preeminence to the lex fori, is unfair as it invites forum shopping.
Therefore, it should not be applied. How did he propose to replace
actionability by the lexfori? After reiterating that the lex loci delicti is the
governing rule, La Forest J. stated: "However, because a rigid rule on
the international level could give rise to injustice, in certain
circumstances, I am not averse to retaining a discretion in the court to
apply our own law to deal with such circumstances. I can, however,
imagine few cases where this would be necessary."113
What are those circumstances? Does it mean that on the
international level the forum can apply its own law to a situation where
two local residents, the tortfeasor and the victim, were involved in an
accident abroad while the lex fori performs only a subsidiary role, for
instance to determine the type of damages to which the victim is
entitled? The answer should be yes. The forum should also be able to
apply the law of a third state where all the parties to the action are
resident, even though it is not the law of the place of accident or the lex
foi. In these two situations, if the victim would be more adequately
compensated by the application of the lex loci delicti, the law of the
common residence should be ignored.
112 Tolofson, supra note 1 at 21, para. 45.
113 Ibid. at 23, para. 49 [emphasis added]. An exception to the !ex loci delici may also lie
where the parties may either tacitly or by agreement choose to be governed by the lexfori if they
find it advisable to do so: ibid. at 22, para. 47.
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There is always the possibility of resorting to public policy to
avoid the application of the foreign lex loci delicti.114 Thus, where the
forum has a serious relationship to the issues or the parties, it could
apply its own law and in so doing base its choice on considerations of
public policy as, for instance, if the lex loci delicti gave little or no
recovery at all. A better approach in such cases is to apply the proper
law of a tort as an exception.
On the interprovincial level, since actionability by the lex fori
denies Full Faith and Credit to the lex loci delicti, and unjustiftability by
the lex loci delicti is unfair to the defendant, it is arguable that adherence
to actionability by the lex loci delicti is even more important when foreign
torts are involved. The mere fact that a province has an interest in a
wrong committed in another province is not enough to warrant its
exercising jurisdiction over that activity as it would encourage forum
shopping. La Forest J. was opposed to the adoption of the proper law of
a tort as an exception to the le loci delicti as he believes that its greatest
defect is its uncertainty and likelihood of creating or prolonging
litigation, even if it is more flexible and better meets the demands of
justice, fairness, and practical results.115 However, "[t]here might, I
suppose be room for an exception where the parties are nationals or
residents of the forum. Objections to an absolute rule of the lex loci
delicti generally arise in such situations."11 6
We are back to the same problem with no definite commitment.
The recognition that there may be room for an exception, especially to
replace actionability by the lexfori, forced La Forest J. to consider public
policy, one of the oldest escape devices to the application of foreign
law-in this case, the let loci delicti of a sister province. Although at one
point he stated that "[he] see[s] a limited role, if any, for considerations
of public policy in actions that take place wholly within Canada,"117 he
rejected that possibility for interprovincial torts where order must
prevail over fairness as a precondition of justice. Differences between
the laws of the provinces are a concomitant of the territoriality
1141bid, at 23, para. 50. In regard to the United States, see ictorv. Speny, 329 P.2d 728 (Ca.
Dist. CA. 1958). Also, note that the parties may either tacitly (in the absence of proof of foreign
law) or by agreement choose to be governed by the lexfori: Tolofson, ibid. at 22, para. 47.
115 Tolofson, ibid. at 24-25, para. 53.
116 bid. at 25, para. 54.
11 71bid. at 23, para. 50.
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principle118 and tend to disappear over time.119 Why should an
exception be allowed at all where two residents of the forum fortuitously
happen to collide on the roads of another province? This is a good
question. Luck, he said, should not be relevant. La Forest J. did not
give any weight to judicial convenience as an argument for displacing the
lex loci delicti: "Whatever relevance that may have in the international
sphere, I fail to see its application within a single country."120 In His
Lordship's opinion, the laws of the common law provinces are
sufficiently similar that their application would not give Canadian judges
and lawyers much difficulty. In opting for a strict rule, La Forest J. also
pointed out that an exception would encourage frivolous cross-claims
and joinders of third parties1 21 : "Any exception adds an element of
uncertainty, and leaves the door open to a resourceful lawyer to attempt
to change the application of the law."122 And further: "Clear application
of law promotes settlement."1 23  Exceptions could lead to injustice.
Therefore, "there is little to gain and much to lose in creating an
exception to the lex loci delicti in relation to domestic litigation." 124
However, there may be a way for the forum to avoid the
application of the lex loci delicti:
The fact that a wrong would not be actionable within the territorial jurisdiction of the
forum if committed there might be a factor better weighed in considering the issue of
forum non conveniens or, on the international plane, whether entertaining the action
would violate the public policy of the forum. Certainlywhere the place of the wrong and
the forum are both in Canada, I am convinced that the application of the forum non
conveniens rule should be sufficient.
125
This is questionable since any Canadian court that takes jurisdiction
must now apply the lex loci delicti.
Can the doctrine of forum non conveniens really play a significant
role as a substitute for actionability by the lex fori or public policy if the
forum is the most appropriate forum or the natural forum? Consider
the case where the cause of action created by the lex loci delicti is not
118 Ibid. at 26, para. 56.
119 Ibid. at 26, para. 57. This may be true with respect to the common law provinces.
120 Ibid. at 27, para. 61.
121 Ibid. at 28, para. 63.
122 Ibid. at 28, para. 64.
123 Ibid. at 28, para. 65.
124 Ibid. at 29, para. 66.
125 Ibid. at 23, para. 50.
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known to the lexfori but both parties are resident or domiciled in the
forum. In such a case the court cannot declare itself forum non
conveniens. It must take jurisdiction and apply the lex loci delicti to the
exclusion of the lex fori. Not only is there a real and substantial
connection with the forum according to Morguard, but the victim could
lose a juridical advantage if the forum declared itself forum non
conveniens, as the court of the locus of the tort may not have jurisdiction
on that basis alone. Applying Amchem, 126 would the lex loci delicti be a
more appropriate jurisdiction for the pursuit of the action and securing
justice? Clearly not in this case.
Only where the forum is not connected with the action, that is,
not the appropriate jurisdiction based on all relevant factors, could it
declare itself forum non conveniens, discourage forum shopping, and
avoid the application of the lex loci delicti. But why would a plaintiff sue
the defendant in that jurisdiction? In Tolofson v. Jensen, British
Columbia was the forum conveniens as was Ontario in Lucas v. Gagnon.
There was no more convenient or appropriate forum. Even if the cause
of action is unknown to the forum, that forum may still be interested in
the litigation since its residents are directly involved.
As we have noted, article 3126 of Quebec's Civil Code contains
built-in exception clauses in order to escape the application of the lex
loci delicti. Traditionally, our courts have, on very few occasions,
sanctioned the public policy exception. They have also used, even more
rarely, the doctrine of renvoi.
The best example of an escape device is the use of
characterization to change legal categories and thereby use a different
choice of law rule to apply the desired law 27 The location of the
connecting factor such as the place of tort is another method that can be
used as an escape device, as is the distinction between substance and
procedure.128 In the past, these manipulative devices never led to an
open-ended analysis. It seems to me that the intransigence of the
Supreme Court will encourage litigants and the courts to resort to these
traditional escape devices, with the exception of public policy, with
respect to interprovincial torts.
126 For a pre-Tolofson case, see Wllson v. Moyes (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 202 (Gen. Div.).
12 7 For example, contract versus tort.
128 For example, the Court may characterize a statute of limitation or the calculation of
damages as procedural. See, for instance, the pre-Tolofson case, Brown v. Marwieh (1993), 123
N.S.R. (2d) 194 (S.C.).
[VOL 33 NO. 1
Back to the Future
4. Specific issue: Characterization of statutes of limitation
When applying the law of Saskatchewan in Tolofson, the
Supreme Court of Canada was faced with the characterization of the
statute of limitation of that province. 29 In a burst of judicial creativity,
it set aside the old common law rule of interpretation. No longer is it
necessary to rely on the language used in the relevant statutory provision
to determine if it extinguishes the right or bars the remedyj 30 Statutes
of limitation are substantive:
The notion that foreign litigants should be denied advantages not available to forum
litigants does not sit well with the proposition, which I have earlier accepted, that the law
that defines the character and consequences of the tort is the lex loci delicti. The court
takes jurisdiction not to administer local law, but for the convenience of litigants, with a
view to responding to modem mobility and the needs of a world or national economic
order.131
This is excellent insofar as the technical distinction between right and
remedy is now outdated. The difficulties involved in making such a
distinction enabled the courts to favour the lexfori, which encouraged
forum shopping. In the future, it will not be possible for the lexfori to be
invoked as a bar to any action based on a foreign tort. However,
procedural rules of the forum may affect the operation of the foreign
statute of limitation, for instance whether or not a litigant must plead
that statute in order to rely on it.
The creation of a new common law rule that foreign limitation
periods are substantive accords with the legislative reform that took
place in England132 and with the law of Quebec! 3 It proves that
common law rules can be modified without resorting to constitutional
imperatives.
129 The time within which the action could be brought in Saskatchewan had expired.
130 Under the old common law, "[a] statute of limitations which operates merely to bar the
plaintiff's remedy is in general procedural, whereas a statute of limitations which operates not only
to bar his or her remedy but also to extinguish his or her right is substantive": Canadian Conflict of
Laws, supra note 18 at 141. See also Brown v.Marwieh (1993), 125 N.S.R. (2d) 389 (CA).
131 Tolofson, supra note 1 at 34, para. 82.
132 Foreign Limitation PeriodsAct (U.K.), 1984, c. 16.
133 Art 3131 C.C.Q.
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5. Summary
In Tolofson, since the law of Saskatchewan applied as the lex loci
delicti, the statute of limitation and the gratuitous-passenger standard of
that province governed. In Lucas, the Supreme Court applied the law of
Quebec, which prevented recovery, especially since Quebec and
Ontario's governments believed that the Quebec no-fault scheme
applied to all accidents in Quebec, regardless of the domicile or
residence of the persons involved.
The two concurring Supreme Court judges, Sopinka and Major,
agreed that "in general" the law applicable to interprovincial torts
should be the lex loci delicti. However, they doubted whether this rule
should be absolute, admitting of no exceptions in circumstances in which
the lex loci delicti would work an injustice.
Let us summarize what the decision stands for:
1. McLean v. Pettigrew is no longer the law in Canada;
2. international torts are governed by the law of the place where
the wrongful activity occurred;
a. exceptions to this rule must be carefully defined;
b. there may be cases where this rule can be set aside in
favour of the lexfori on the basis of public policy;
3. interprovincial torts are governed exclusively by the law of the
place where the wrongful activity occurred;
a. there are no exceptions to this rule, but its application
could possibly be avoided by resorting to the doctrine of
forum non conveniens; and
4. statutes of limitation are substantive.
6. Questions left unanswered
The decision of the Supreme Court leaves several questions
unanswered, including the possibility of exceptions to the lex loci delicti
rule already discussed above.
a) Place of tort
The first question relates to the place of tort. La Forest J. was of
the opinion that, for choice of law purposes, the place of tort is where
the wrongful activity occurred. It is the law of that place which must
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determine the character of the wrong and its legal consequences 3 4
However, where all the facts and events that constitute the wrongful
activity occur in one state while the consequences of that activity are felt
in another state, His Lordship seemed to be prepared to consider the
place of injury, that is, where the harm ensued, as the place of tort!3 5 In
the two cases before the Court the problem did not arise as the wrongful
activity and the injury occurred in the same province.
It is not necessary to re-examine here all the aspects of the
determination of the place of tort in complex situations, as this has
already been done elsewherej 3 6 Suffice it to say that Moran v. Pyle
137
does not contain an adequate answer as it is questionable whether
jurisdictional cases should be used for choice of law purposes. To adopt
the test of most real and substantial connection to determine the place of
tort is not satisfactory either. In order to avoid using the determination
of the place of tort as an escape device, it would have been better if the
Court had definitely held that in all situations the place of injury is the
place of tort, instead of just alluding to it. Another formulation of the
rule could have been as follows: "as a general rule, the law to be applied
in torts is the law of the place where the injury occurred."138 This would
avoid the difficulties involved in dealing with the formal concept of the
place of tort. However, the place of injury may be difficult to determine
where the victim suffered harm in different jurisdictions, as is often the
case with respect to defamation. Furthermore, some types of harm, like
financial harm, are not easy to localize physically.
If an exception based on the proper law of a tort were
introduced, there would be no need to resort to the concept of the place
134 Tolofson, supra note 1 at 20, para. 42.
135 "[I]t may well be that the consequences would be held to constitute the wrong": ibid. Ia
regard to the United States, see Schultz v. Boy Scouts ofAmerica Inc., supra note 62.
136 See Canadian Conflict of Laws, supra note 18 at 648-53. See also, for example, Banco do
Brasil S.A. v. Alexandros G. Tsavliris (The), [1992] 3 F.C. 735 (CA.), which involved intimidation
inducing breach of contract; and Walker v. Bank of New York Inc. (1994), 16 O.R. (3d) 504 (CA),
rev'ing (1993) 15 O.R. (3d) 596 (Gen. Div.), which involved deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, false
imprisonment, and conspiracy.
137 [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393. According to North & Fawcett, supra note 70 at 553:
[T]he jurisdictional test adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada, under which it would
not be inappropriate to regard a tort as having occurred in any country substantially
affected by the defendant's activities and whose law is likely to have been in the
reasonable contemplation of the parties is unworkable in the choice of law context, since
it could lead to the result that a tort may be committed in more than one State at once.
138 Tolofton, supra note 1 at 20, para. 42. The italicized word replaces the original word
"activity" because, in fact, this meaning is indicated by the surrounding text.
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of tort. The place of injury and the place of the wrongful activity would
just be factors to be taken into consideration when determining that law.
In this regard, it should be noted that Mr. Justice La Forest used the
prefatory words "in general." 139 This could open the door to exceptions
even though, later on in the course of his opinion, he rejected this
possibility.
b) Scope of new rule
Another issue concerns the scope of the new rule. Does it apply
to all issues in tort? La Forest J. stated that the rule applies to the
definition of the obligation and its consequences. 140 This means the
rights and liabilities of the parties.
Civil actionability by the lex loci delicti denotes civil liability in
accordance with the lex loci delicti, which includes the extent of such
liability. The provisions of the lex loci delicti denying, limiting, or
qualifying the recovery of damages must be taken into consideration.
The question is whether civil liability of the kind sought to be imposed
exists in respect of the relevant claim as between the actual parties under
the lex loci delicti.141 This interpretation is consistent with the territorial-
vested rights theory propounded by Willes J. in Phillips v. Eyre 142 that
has long been discredited in the United States, but seems to have
regained respectability in Canada. D'pecage is rejected. The law of the
place of tort determines: the tortious character of the conduct; the
standard of care; the duty owed to the plaintiff (including gratuitous
passengers); causation; conditions for liability; contributory negligence
and assumption of risk; imputed negligence; joint liability; whether an
interest is entitled to legal protection; defences, including the statute of
limitation; duty or privilege to act; and survival of action. With respect
to damages and contribution, the lex loci delicti covers questions of
remoteness and heads of damage, whereas their quantification, that is,
the measure of damages, is governed by the lex fori. The lex loci delicti
rule also applies to no-fault liability with respect to automobile
139 Ibid. But see at 29, para. 66.
140 kid. at 23, para. 50.
141 See Lord Wilberforce in Boys v. Chaplin, supra note 67 at 389. See also Slaterv. Mexican
National Railway Co., 194 U.S. 120 at 126 (1940).
142 Supra note 63 at 28. Note that in the Law Commission's report, supra note 71, it was
stated, at 27, that "[a]ll tortious issues should be governed by the same choice of law rule.... [This]
prevents a party from accepting certain consequences but not others of the applicable law."
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accidents, whether a tort-state person is injured in a no-fault province or
a no-fault state or province person is injured in another no-fault state or
province, and whether the no-fault schemes are identical.1 43
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should be praised for clearing the air. Here
is one instance where judicial law-making may be of some service to
private international law, although the rule adopted will disappoint
many scholars. The selection of the lex loci delicti, assuming that it
means the law of the place of injury in complex situations, is a
progressive step even if it amounts to a return to the old historical rule:
back to the future! It also avoids going through the growing pains of the
American revolution. The characterization of statutes of limitation as
substantive is also an excellent move. These new rules should provide
the certainty which flows from the principle of order so close to Mr.
Justice La Forest's heart.
Dropping the requirement of actionability by the lexfori was long
overdue and I have no quarrel with it. On the other hand, like Sopinka
and Major JJ., I regret that the majority did not provide a specific
exception to be used sparingly as a flexible escape to achieve justice
when needed, a principle which is also mentioned on several occasions
by Mr. Justice La Forest. I am unwilling to place trust in the unfettered
use-of the lex loci delicti and, upon reflection, even with respect to
interprovincial torts. One advantage of the lex loci delicti rule is that a
single law governs all similar claims asserted against a defendant in a
class action; for instance, a plane crash. However, let us hope that
Canadian litigants and judges will be untroubled by problems of
precedent and soon find flexible escapes, as they finally did with respect
to McLean v. Pettigrew, so as not to block the evolution of choice of law
rules in that important area of private international law. A good case
could be made for displacing the lex loci delicti with respect to loss
distribution when all the parties reside or are domiciled in the forum
state or province.
Again, I must state that I object to the progressive
constitutionalization of private international law rules applicable to
interprovincial situations on the basis of an implied Full Faith and
143 No-fault schemes are in force in all provinces. In regard to Quebec, see C. Walsh, "'A
Stranger in the Promised Land?' The Non-Resident Accident Victim and the Qu6bec No-Fault
Plan" (1988) 37 U.N.B. UJ. 173.
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Credit clause, which finds its expression in the principles of order and
fairness, as the arguments advanced in support thereof are not
convincing. In the United States, even in the presence of explicit Full
Faith and Credit and Due Process clauses in the Constitution, the
Supreme Court's intervention has been quite subdued. The
constitutional yoke imposed on the states is very light. The private
international law rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Morguard, Amchem, and Tolofson are sensible common law rules. They
can stand on their own merits. They are justified by common sense and
do not require the support of the Constitution. They should apply to
both international and interprovincial situations. How can an implied
Full Faith and Credit clause furnish any definite solution to the question
of the selection of the appropriate law for solving all interprovincial
conflicts?
What is next on the Court's agenda? Is Mr. Justice La Forest
going to continue his crusade to constitutionalize all private
international law rules applicable to interprovincial situations? 144 When
the occasion arises, will he give definite constitutional status to the le
loci delicti as he did in Hunt with respect to the new common law rules in
Morguard and Amchem? Will the court move on to contracts-a likely
target-and tell us that the inherent Full Faith and Credit clause
compels the application of the law of the place of contracting or the law
of the place of performance, or some other law, or that article 3117 of
Quebee's Civil Code dealing with consumer contracts does not meet the
principles of order and fairness? It is a dangerous course of action.
Judicial reform of common law private international law rules is a
legitimate objective but it must be done in an orderly manner, which is a
difficult taskwhen the Supreme Court may have to wait a long time for a
case to come before it. One must not see a constitutional issue lurking
behind every rule of Canadian private international law. The United
States Supreme Court has avoided this attitude. The application of the
law that has a or the most real and substantial connection, which is one
of the major characteristics of modern private international law, is
equally relevant to interprovincial and international situations. There is
no need to adopt strict rules which would be difficult to change once
they are constitutionally entrenched. The desire for unity of legal
144 La Forest J. seems to have endorsed wholeheartedly the views of some authors who, like J.
Swan in "The Canadian Constitution, Federalism and the Conflict of Laws" (1985) 63 Can. Bar
Rev. 271, called for the complete replacement of existing private international law rules by new ones
that would take into account constitutional imperatives. Fortunately, not so many cases have
enabled the Supreme Court to succumb to this constitutional temptation.
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consequences throughout Canada often mentioned by Mr. Justice La
Forest as a legitimate constitutionally correct objective is not as strong in
our country as it is in Australia, due to the existence of two legal systems
and, at the political level, the promotion of multiculturalism. Diversity is
more important here.
On the eve of the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court of
Canada must not usher Canadian private international law rules into a
period of strict law characterized by fixed, rigid rules, designed to
achieve order rather than fairness. If a choice is to be made, contrary to
the opinion expressed by La Forest J.,145 fairness should prevail over
order. This does not mean that some limits must not be placed on
justice in individual cases. Choice of law rules should refer to the legal
order "which, judging by external circumstances, seems most
appropriate."' 46 For instance, providing a proper law exception to the
lex loci delicti in difficult cases147 in both interprovincial and
international situations would have been a good compromise in order to
reconcile the principles of order and fairness.
145 Tolofson, supra note 1 at 25-26, para. 56. For an excellent analysis of the need to
accommodate the tension between predictability and flexibility in a conflicts case, see Hay, supra
note 22, especially at 334ff. The need for certainty in torts is not as great as in contract. Fairness is
generally fostered by exceptions to the general rule.
146 Neuhaus, supra note 22 at 805.
147 See the Law Commission's Report, supra note 69 at 10, para 3.3.
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